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Abstract
Spoofing detection for automatic speaker verification (ASV),
which is to discriminate between live speech and attacks, has
received increasing attentions recently. However, all the previ-
ous studies have been done on the clean data without significant
additive noise. To simulate the real-life scenarios, we perform
a preliminary investigation of spoofing detection under addi-
tive noisy conditions, and also describe an initial database for
this task. The noisy database is based on the ASVspoof chal-
lenge 2015 database and generated by artificially adding back-
ground noises at different signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). Five
different additive noises are included. Our preliminary results
show that using the model trained from clean data, the system
performance degrades significantly in noisy conditions. Phase-
based feature is more noise robust than magnitude-based fea-
tures. And the systems perform significantly differ under dif-
ferent noise scenarios.
1. Introduction
Recently, automatic speaker verification (ASV) has been sig-
nificantly advanced to the point of mass-market adoption [1–4].
However, most of current ASV systems assume human voices,
and there are concerns that whether the systems can still achieve
robust performance in the face of diverse spoofing attacks. A
spoofing attack is that an attacker attempts to manipulate an
ASV result for a target genuine speaker to obtain access per-
mission. A significant amount of evidences have confirmed
the vulnerability of current state-of-the-art ASV systems under
spoofing attacks as reviewed in [5]. This has led to the active
development of spoofing countermeasures, also called spoofing
detection, that is to discriminate human and spoofed speech.
In the past several years, spoofing detection for speaker
recognition has been studied on a variety of diverse datasets.
In [6, 7], the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) corpus was used to as-
sess countermeasures for speech synthesis attacks. In [8], the
publicly available RSR2015 corpus was used to evaluate spoof-
ing detection for replay attacks. In [9, 10], synthetic speech
from the Blizzard challenge [11] was used for speech synthe-
sis spoofing detection. In [12], a recently released spoofing and
anti-spoofing (SAS) corpus as a standard spoofing database was
used to assess speech synthesis and voice conversion spoofing
countermeasures. We note that WSJ, SAS and Blizzard chal-
lenge databases were recorded by high-quality microphones in
sound-proofing environment, while the RSR2015 corpus was
recorded by multiple mobile devices in a quiet office room. All
these databases do not have any significant channel and/or addi-
tive noise. These databases allow us to focus on spoofing effects
but do not simulate practical scenarios of ASV applications.
There are also some studies that use data with channel
noise. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Speaker Recognition Evaluation (SRE) 2006 database
which has significant telephone channel noise was used to as-
sess voice conversion spoofing countermeasures in [13–17].
In [18], a so-called AVspoof database includes replay, speech
synthesis and voice conversion spoofing attacks to simu-
late realistic scenarios, which re-recorded synthetic or voice-
converted speech using multiple mobile devices.
In general, all the databases used in the past spoofing detec-
tion studies do not consider additive noise, even the recent stan-
dard spoofing detection databases: SAS1 and ASVspoof 2015
challenge2 databases. However, in practical scenarios, it is hard
to avoid additive and/or channel noise. Hence, another concern
for ASV deployment arises that whether currently developed
spoofing detection algorithms/systems are still effective under
noisy conditions.
In this work, we focus on spoofing detection under additive
noisy conditions. We perform a preliminary investigation of
spoofing detection under noisy conditions using current state-
of-the-art countermeasure techniques; and also briefly introduce
an initial database we built for the task3. In general, we aim to
answer the following questions:
• Do current state-of-the-art spoofing detection algorithms
work well under additive noisy conditions?
• How additive noises affect the spoofing detection perfor-
mance?
• What kind of noise is more serious to degrade the perfor-
mance of spoofing detection algorithms?
We believe better understanding of above questions and the
noisy database will drive the development of generalised and
noise robust spoofing detection algorithms.
1SAS corpus is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/
ds/252
2ASVspoof 2015 corpus is available at: http://dx.doi.org/
10.7488/ds/298
3The noisy database will be publicly-available for free under a CC-
BY license.
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2. Noisy Database
In order to represent the practical application scenarios for
spoofing detection, we attempt to design a database in addi-
tive noisy environments based on the ASVspoof 2015 challenge
database [19].
ASVspoof database is a spoofing and anti-spoofing
database, consisting of both genuine (human speech) and ten
types of spoofed speech (named as S1-S10 in ASVspoof 2015
challenge) implemented by three speech synthesis and seven
voice conversion spoofing algorithms. The ASVspoof database
contains three subsets, including training, development and
evaluation sets. The training and development sets only con-
tain known attacks (S1-S5); while the evaluation set consists of
both known and unknown (S6-S10) attacks. More details and
protocols about the ASVspoof database can be found in [19].
This noisy version aims to quantify the effects of current
spoofing detection algorithms in noise conditions and to facil-
itate future assessment work in this task. In this section, we
will briefly introduce the types of noise to be added, and the
procedure of adding noise.
2.1. Noise signals
Five types of noise signals, representing the probable appli-
cation scenarios, are used for the construction of the noisy
ASVspoof database. A subset of three types of noise, white
noise, speech babble and vehicle interior noise, are selected
from NOISEX-92 database [20]. Another two types mixed
noise, street noise and cafe noise, are selected from QUT-
NOISE database [21]. These are standard types of additive
noise used for speech recognition [21–23], speaker verifica-
tion [24, 25] and speech enhancement [26]. We briefly describe
these noises as follows:
• White Noise: The random signal with a constant power
spectral density.
• Babble Noise: Speech babble and the recording is made in
a canteen with 100 people speaking.
• Volvo Noise: Vehicle interior noise and the recording is
made in Volvo 340 on an asphalt road, rainy conditions.
• Street Noise: Mixed noise, which is made at the road-
side near inner-city, mainly consisting of road traffic noise,
pedestrian traffic noise and bird noise.
• Cafe Noise: Mixed noise, which is made in outdoor cafe en-
vironment, mainly consisting of speech babble and kitchen
noise from the cafe environment.
Figure 1 shows the spectrogram of all the five noises. We
can classify the noises into stationary noise and non-stationary
noise. White noise and Volvo noise are stationary noise. While
babble noise, street noise and cafe noise are recorded in non-
stationary noise environment, whose the magnitude and phase
spectrogram are varied over time.
2.2. Adding noise
The data from ASVspoof database are considered as clean data.
Noise is artificially added to the clean data. The Filtering and
Noise Adding Tool (FaNT)4 is used for the adding noise pro-
cess. The noisy signals are generated by adding the clean
speech and noise files together at various SNRs. As the silence
periods appear in many speech files of ASVspoof database, it
4http://dnt.kr.hs-niederrhein.de/
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Figure 1: The spectrogram of different noise file.
is important to calculate the SNR only based on the sections of
speech signal. The bandpass filter or frequency weighting are
often used for SNR calculation, to ensure the SNR are appro-
priate and comparable. In this work, to add the noise based on
the human hearing perception, we define the SNR as the ratio
of signal to noise energy after filtering both signals with the A-
weighting filter. This filter emphasizes the frequencies around
3 kHz to 6 kHz where the human ear is most sensitive and give
a lower response for the very high and very low frequencies to
which the ear is less sensitive [27]. Hence, noises such as Volvo
noise, whose energy distribution concentrates more on very low
frequency (below 1 kHz), tend to have higher energy at the same
SNR level.
For each clean signal in the development and evaluation sets
of ASVspoof database, fifteen noisy versions of the signal are
generated consisting of five types of noise in three SNR levels.
Given a clean signal, for each noise type, we take a segment of
the noise signal with equal length as the clean signal but random
starting point from the whole noise file. Then the noise segment
is scaled and added to the clean signal in 20 dB, 10 dB and 0
dB SNR levels.
After the adding noise process, the clipping may occur, es-
pecially at low SNR levels due to high noise energy. In order to
maintain a stable spectrogram representation of the signal, the
signal is scaled to avoid the clipping.
All the five types of noise are added to the ASVspoof
database at the SNRs of 20 dB, 10dB, and 0 dB. Hence, the
ASVspoof noisy database is fifteen times of the clean database.
3. Benchmarking system
In order to demonstrate the utility of the ASVspoof noisy
database, we conduct a series of experiments to examine the
performance of spoofing speech detection system on a range of
SNRs in all five noise scenarios.
The detection system, as shown in Figure 2, consists of (a)
the feature extraction module to extract six types of feature used
(a) Feature extraction
(b) Classification
(c) Fusion
Feature 1
Dynamic feature 
Concatenation
Feature 6
Dynamic feature 
Concatenation
MLP Classifier 1 MLP Classifier 6
Fusion
Noisy speech
……
……
……
Score 1 Score 6 
Fused score 
……
Figure 2: The architecture of our detection system, including
(a) the feature extraction module, (b) the classification module
and (c) the score fusion module.
for classification; (b) the classification module to calculate the
score for each feature; (c) the score fusion module to fused the
scores obtained from six classifiers. The details of these three
modules are introduced as follows.
3.1. Feature extraction
Similar to our previous system described in [28, 29], six types
of feature are extracted. As shown in Figure 2 (a), given a noisy
waveform, the Hamming window and direct current (DC) offset
removal are applied on each analysis frame. Then short-time
Fourier transform (STFT) is applied on the speech signal using
analysis window of 25ms with 15ms overlap. The FFT length is
chosen to be 512 and the dimension of all the original features
are 256. For the n-th frame, the magnitude and phase spectrum,
|X(n, ω)| and θ(n, ω), are obtained by
X(n, ω) = |X(n, ω)|ejθ(n,ω), (1)
After that, two magnitude-based features, namely log mag-
nitude spectrum (LMS) and residual log magnitude spectrum
(RLMS) are derived from magnitude spectrum. Four phase-
based features, namely instantaneous frequency derivative (IF),
baseband phase difference (BPD), group delay (GD) and modi-
fied group delay (MGD), are derived from phase spectrum.
The features are summarized as follows:
• LMS: The log magnitude spectrum feature can be ex-
pressed as LMS(n, ω) = log(|X(n, ω)|). The LMS con-
tains the formant information, harmonic structure and all
the spectral detail of speech signal.
• RLMS: The residual log magnitude spectrum feature is
the LMS extracted from the linear predictive coding (LPC)
residual signal. As the formant information is removed, this
feature can better analyses the harmonic structure and spec-
tral details.
• IF: Instantaneous frequency [30] is the derivative of the
phase along time axis and captures the temporal informa-
tion of phase. It is defined as:
IF(n, ω) = princ(θ(n, ω)− θ(n− 1, ω)). (2)
where princ(·) represents the principal value operator,
mapping the input onto [−pi;pi] interval by adding integer
numbers of 2pi.
• BPD: Baseband phase difference [31] is another phase fea-
ture derived from IF and baseband STFT. For the n-th
frame, the BPD is calculated as:
BPD(n, ω) = princ(IF(n, ω)− Ωkl), (3)
where Ωk = 2pik/L is the normalized angular frequencies.
• GD: Group delay [32] is a representation of filter phase re-
sponse, which is defined as the negative derivative of the
Fourier transform phase. It is a frame-based feature, used to
capture the phase distortion along frequency axis.
GD(n, ω) = princ{θ(n, ω)− θ(n, ω − 1)}, (4)
• MGD: A variation of GD, which can obtain a more clear
phase pattern than GD. The MGD [32] feature of frame n
is calculated as:
τ(n, ω) =
XR(n, ω)YR(n, ω) +XI(n, ω)YI(n, ω)
|S(n, ω)|2γ ,
(5)
MGD(n, ω) =
τ(n, ω)
|τ(n, ω)| |τ(n, ω)|
α, (6)
where XR(n, ω) and XI(n, ω) denote the real and image
part of STFT for x(l); while YR(n, ω) and YI(n, ω) de-
note the real and image part of STFT for lx(l), respectively.
S(n, ω) is the smoothed spectrum of |X(n, ω)|. Based on
experimental results, the values of γ and α are set to 0.7 and
0.2 respectively.
In Fig 3 and Fig 4, we present the LMS and IF features
extracted from clean and the noisy signals. The noisy signals
include the white and street noise scenarios at the SNR of 20 dB,
10 dB and 0 dB. We observe that both LMS and IF feature are
distorted by additive noise significantly. The patterns become
more blurred for lower SNRs.
3.2. Classifier
Figure 2 (b) shows the classification part of the detection sys-
tem. Our previous multilayer perceptron (MLP) based spoofing
speech detection system [29] is used in this work. Each of the
features mentioned above with its delta and acceleration coef-
ficients is used as the input vector to train its own classifier.
The MLP, which contains one hidden layer with 2,048 sigmoid
nodes, is used to predict the posterior probability of the input
vector being synthetic speech. The score is calculated by aver-
aging the posterior probabilities of all the frames over the utter-
ance. Noted that, in this work, all the MLP classifier are trained
from clean data.
3.3. Evaluation metrics and fusion
The equal error rate (EER), where false acceptance rate and
miss rejection rate become equal, is used to evaluate the sys-
tem performance.
As described in Section 3.1, different features are designed
to detect different types of artifacts. In order to benefit the ad-
vantages of each feature and improve the system stability, a
score level fusion is applied. Figure 2 (c) shows score fusion
of the detection system.
The fusion is applied on the feature-based results in differ-
ent noise scenarios. Based on our preliminary experiments, the
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Figure 3: Demonstration of the LMS feature for utterance D14 1000302, in both clean and noise scenarios.
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Figure 4: Demonstration of the IF features for utterance D14 1000302, in both clean and noise scenarios.
weighted summation fusion, tuned on the development data set,
exhibits the over-fitting effects at street and cafe noise scenar-
ios. To avoid this problem, the scores of all systems are simply
averaged to produce the final score.
In this work, the Bosaris toolkit5 is used to compute the
EERs of each feature and the fused system.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental setups
The database used in the experiments consist of three subsets,
including training set, development set and evaluation set. The
training set is clean speech data taken from ASVspoof database.
As the training set consists of clean data only, it models the
speech without noise distortion and represents all the speech
information. The best performance of the clean classifier is ob-
tained in the case of testing on clean data, which can be found
in our previous work [29].
The development and evaluation sets are chosen from the
5https://sites.google.com/site/bosaristoolkit/
noisy ASVspoof database, including five noise scenarios at
three different SNRs as described in Section 2. Because the
classifier used in these experiments is the same as that of our
previous work [29], these results are comparable with the re-
sults in clean condition.
4.2. Evaluation results
As the results on the development set are similar to that of the
S1 to S5 on the evaluation set, only the feature-based results
of the evaluation set are reported. The results are shown inde-
pendently as the known attacks (S1-S5), the unknown attacks
(S6-S9) and the unknown attacks generated by waveform con-
catenation (S10). The EERs are listed in Table 1 for both noisy
dataset and clean dataset using the clean classifier.
We first analyse the effect of noisy data for the detection
system using different features. In general, across all the five
noise scenarios, the systems perform worse than that of clean
condition. As expected, in most spoof attacks, the detection
performance deteriorates as SNR decreases. We notice that,
in most noisy scenarios, the magnitude-based features, LMS
Table 1: Average EERs (%) of different features on the evaluation set. Clean indicates the results of our previous work [29].
Feature LMS RLMS IF BPD GD MGD Fusion LMS RLMS IF BPD GD MGD Fusion LMS RLMS IF BPD GD MGD Fusion
clean 0.02 0.34 1.31 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.36 1.31 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.00 35.24 30.80 25.56 30.67 33.90 38.54 28.87
white_snr_20 2.49 33.94 3.35 3.24 6.52 8.70 2.50 7.45 35.35 4.23 3.64 5.86 11.65 3.20 46.02 48.42 39.23 37.68 46.40 47.72 43.36
white_snr_10 23.77 34.46 5.89 4.70 12.04 24.55 3.74 15.40 35.71 8.42 6.34 11.60 26.61 4.86 48.07 48.81 41.47 39.70 47.62 47.72 45.22
white_snr_0 37.80 37.85 14.01 11.66 24.49 42.89 10.64 32.17 41.09 20.00 17.16 25.69 43.18 15.27 48.31 49.16 45.00 44.32 48.85 47.71 46.80
babble_snr_20 7.64 47.38 3.45 5.61 4.82 2.93 3.77 7.29 48.04 4.13 6.66 5.72 4.64 4.71 45.98 48.41 40.12 42.35 44.34 47.68 46.11
babble_snr_10 15.40 48.50 12.01 14.81 17.28 8.58 10.09 14.99 48.49 15.61 19.49 20.09 13.94 14.11 42.06 48.22 45.18 45.60 44.96 47.71 46.44
babble_snr_0 28.19 48.42 29.45 31.80 34.48 25.06 25.09 25.72 48.52 33.78 36.78 36.29 31.54 28.53 43.46 48.34 46.50 46.84 46.45 47.62 47.19
volvo_snr_20 13.75 42.53 15.48 19.69 16.55 15.34 9.69 14.59 47.39 19.10 21.76 19.86 19.71 12.12 47.79 44.70 42.73 47.75 47.26 47.89 46.16
volvo_snr_10 27.22 45.21 26.90 29.04 30.37 19.57 20.61 27.63 47.21 30.76 33.06 34.08 24.15 23.93 48.08 47.28 44.52 47.85 47.41 47.00 47.88
volvo_snr_0 38.89 47.56 37.28 38.05 40.84 30.37 37.98 39.69 47.07 39.56 41.00 43.21 34.54 39.24 47.88 49.12 45.84 47.68 47.30 46.54 47.94
street_snr_20 15.92 39.96 6.49 7.55 11.61 9.61 7.87 13.81 38.73 7.80 9.82 15.43 13.90 8.38 37.70 44.22 42.59 43.79 45.38 47.62 37.97
street_snr_10 30.17 44.60 13.72 13.95 22.91 20.52 18.65 26.15 44.82 15.77 18.00 26.51 25.89 18.72 41.02 47.69 45.25 45.75 45.38 47.78 39.65
street_snr_0 43.44 47.35 27.27 28.52 34.80 33.44 32.44 39.22 47.03 28.78 32.33 35.81 37.17 31.65 48.80 50.00 47.05 46.94 47.18 47.88 47.53
cafe_snr_20 12.32 34.76 4.00 5.19 8.21 7.23 4.64 8.70 31.25 4.39 6.50 9.16 10.14 4.15 38.54 48.32 40.82 40.18 46.14 47.77 41.05
cafe_snr_10 26.53 42.61 5.91 6.83 15.91 20.29 16.16 20.07 40.09 6.86 9.09 15.88 23.88 13.91 42.10 50.00 41.70 42.34 45.88 47.77 44.35
cafe_snr_0 44.79 46.97 13.72 13.34 28.63 39.28 35.39 39.46 45.55 15.00 17.32 25.67 39.43 32.16 49.92 50.00 45.21 44.96 47.33 47.82 48.51
Average EER cross 
noise scenarios
24.55 42.81 14.60 15.60 20.63 20.56 15.95 22.16 43.09 16.95 18.60 22.06 24.02 17.00 45.05 48.18 43.55 44.25 46.53 47.62 45.08
S1-S5 (Known) S6-S9 (Unknown) S10 (Unknown)
and RLMS, perform worse than the phase-based features, IF,
BPD, GD and MGD. In particular, in all the spoofing attacks,
the RLMS obtains much higher EERs than other features. This
may be due to that the LPC filter is not robust in noisy envi-
ronments [33], which affects the quality of RLMS. Among the
phase-based features, IF and BPD outperform other features in
terms of the average EERs over all the noise scenarios. We also
found that, some features are effective for particular noise sce-
nario. For example, in the babble noise scenario, the MGD is
capable to obtain low error rates. While in white, street, and
cafe noises, IF and BPD perform much better than other fea-
tures.
Next, we compare the performance across different types of
attack in noise conditions. Because S1-S5 attacks are available
for training, even in noisy condition, the lower error rates are
obtained in these attacks than the rest types of attack. Although
the error rates of S6-S9 is higher than that of S1-S5, the results
still comparable. This is consistent with the results in clean
condition [29]. For S10, even apply the score fusion, the error
rates of all the features are significantly higher than that of S1-
S9. Hence, we conclude that in both clean and noisy conditions,
the detection of S10 is still the most challenge task among the
spoofing attacks.
4.3. Fusion results
Table 2 presents the results of fused systems on both develop-
ment and evaluation sets. We first examine the results at differ-
ent SNRs. In all the noise scenarios at the SNR of 20 dB, the
system performance degradation significant differ for different
noise scenarios. On the development set, the EERs of different
fuse systems are between 2.52% (cafe noise) to 8.32% (Volvo
noise); while on the evaluation set, the EERs are varies between
5.25% (white noise) to 14.31% (Volvo noise). However, at the
SNR of 0 dB, all the systems performance degrade significantly
on both development and evaluation set. Fig 3 and Fig 4 show
that most of the feature patterns are lost in such low SNR.
Then, we analyse the fused results in different noise sce-
narios. Among all the noise scenarios, the system under white
noise scenario performs best, which constantly achieves lowest
error rates. Especially, at low SNRs, 10 dB and 0 dB, the system
under white noise outperform that of other noise scenarios sig-
nificantly. As discussed in Section 2.2, compare to other types
of noise, the Volvo noise tends to give higher energy at the same
SNR level, resulting in more distortions in the noisy signals and
higher EERs.
For the non-stationary noisy conditions, the features dis-
torted by such noise are time-varying. Consequently, in these
noise conditions, the system performance degrades more than
white noise scenarios. This provides more challenge to the sys-
tem to detect the spoofed attacks in such noisy conditions.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we constructed a noisy database for spoofing
and anti-spoofing research. This database is generated from
the ASVspoof database, adding five types of additive noise at
three SNR levels. To provide the benchmark results, we use the
state-of-the-art spoofing detection system to detect the spoofing
attacks in noisy conditions. The preliminary results using the
classifier trained from clean data shown that,
• the performance of detection systems degrade in all the
noise scenarios. The system performance deteriorates as
SNR decreases;
• in noisy environments, even the best EER is about 4% lower
(white noise at 20 dB) than that of clean condition;
• in general, the non-stationary noises affect the detection
system more seriously;
• the system performance varies significantly under different
noise scenarios and the phase-based features are noise ro-
bust than magnitude-based features.
In this paper, we only presented benchmark results to
demonstrate the vulnerability of current spoofing detection sys-
tems under additive noise conditions. In future work, we will
use convolutional noise, such as channel noise and reverberate
noise, to simulate the spoofing attacks in more complex noise
scenarios. Moreover, the classifier presented in this work was
trained from the clean data. There are also plans to exam the
effectiveness of multi-condition training for spoofing detection
under noisy conditions. Finally, a proper score fusion method
will be investigated to both avoid the over-fitting effects and im-
prove the system performance.
Table 2: EERs (%) of fused system on both development and evaluation sets. Clean indicates the results of our previous work [29].
Feature S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Average S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Average
clean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.87 2.89
white_snr_20 2.49 4.23 0.56 0.51 6.47 2.85 2.77 3.31 0.32 0.31 5.81 5.73 2.86 1.81 2.40 43.36 6.87
white_snr_10 3.92 6.33 2.42 2.21 7.40 4.46 4.38 5.18 1.39 1.32 6.41 6.40 5.61 2.98 4.46 45.22 8.34
white_snr_0 10.30 16.04 6.27 5.93 14.55 10.62 11.99 16.00 5.31 5.09 14.83 15.67 18.29 12.66 14.45 46.80 16.11
babble_snr_20 7.17 5.97 2.42 2.38 8.42 5.28 4.65 4.48 0.77 0.73 8.25 8.75 3.60 3.65 2.84 46.11 8.38
babble_snr_10 16.51 17.14 5.02 4.70 14.30 11.53 14.65 15.63 2.76 2.51 14.90 17.49 18.14 10.44 10.40 46.44 15.33
babble_snr_0 32.48 33.45 15.88 15.83 29.96 25.52 31.75 32.93 15.04 14.90 30.84 33.34 35.63 18.76 26.40 47.19 28.68
volvo_snr_20 14.21 12.94 0.86 0.77 12.80 8.32 19.66 14.46 1.46 1.47 11.37 12.35 15.03 14.12 6.97 46.16 14.31
volvo_snr_10 31.83 27.06 10.80 10.60 27.86 21.63 33.39 24.96 9.68 9.55 25.46 24.86 27.16 26.41 17.30 47.88 24.67
volvo_snr_0 44.42 40.40 31.53 31.59 43.06 38.20 45.14 39.85 31.87 31.91 41.15 39.98 39.74 40.69 36.55 47.94 39.48
street_snr_20 4.87 6.42 1.97 1.77 7.44 4.49 8.72 10.75 5.20 5.28 9.38 11.03 10.52 4.90 7.07 37.97 11.08
street_snr_10 13.23 15.99 8.46 8.16 14.32 12.03 19.94 22.64 15.26 15.27 20.13 22.52 22.34 12.02 18.01 39.65 20.78
street_snr_0 26.62 29.18 23.01 23.12 27.75 25.94 33.20 34.53 30.52 30.48 33.47 34.42 34.26 26.96 30.95 47.53 33.63
cafe_snr_20 1.56 3.00 1.00 0.83 6.21 2.52 4.28 4.77 3.69 3.62 6.84 7.14 4.05 2.03 3.37 41.05 8.08
cafe_snr_10 6.12 8.69 6.25 6.13 9.67 7.37 14.15 17.06 16.76 16.74 16.11 18.28 16.53 7.68 13.14 44.35 18.08
cafe_snr_0 25.26 26.73 29.01 28.66 27.37 27.41 33.33 33.51 38.41 38.48 33.23 33.92 33.44 29.73 31.55 48.51 35.41
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